

MICHAEL RENEMANN

*Mastri on “præcisio obiectiva”*

*Introduction*

In 1649, Thomas Compton-Carleton reports that in these days, among the schoolmen, no question is more famous than that concerning the *præcisiones obiectivæ*. The dispute is fought with an effort so great as if it was the Gordian knot of philosophy, as if philosophy’s fate depended upon it.<sup>1</sup>

Mastri, in his 1646 account of the situation, is less poetic, but he confirms that a big change has been taking place. Among the older ones, he explains, *præcisiones obiectivæ* are not explicitly discussed, because at their time it would have been a sacrilege to deny them.<sup>2</sup> And nowadays some Jesuits, namely Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza (1578-1641), Rodrigo de Arriaga (1592-1667) and Francisco de Oviedo (1602-1651), «reject the *præcisio obiectiva*,

1. «Nulla celebrior hodie, quam de Præcisionibus, in scholis quæstio; nulla, maiore vel argumentorum, vel animorum contentione disputata, quasi ut ille olim nodus Phrygiæ, ita hic Philosophiæ fatum foret» (Thomas COMPTON-CARLETON, *Philosophia Universa*, disp. 24 *Denturne Præcisiones Obiectivæ*, [Prologus], Antwerpen 1649, p. 97).

2. «(...) pro complemento hujus tractatus de identitatibus, et distinctionibus, opus est propositum examinare quæsitum, quod quidem apud Antiquiores in terminis motum non reperitur, eo quia piaculum fuisset tunc temporis præcisiones negare obiectivas» (MASTRI, *In Met.*, disp. 6 *De passionibus entis*, q. 16 *Num præter præcisiones formales, etiam obiectivæ sint admittendæ*, [Prologus], n. 292; in MASTRI – BELLUTO, *Philosophiæ ad mentem Scoti cursus integer*, Venetiis 1678, vol. IV (archetypal edition Venetiis 1646), p. 391a).

on which the whole metaphysical doctrine of Scotus and Thomas is based, and allow only *præcisiones formales*».<sup>3</sup>

In fact, some of the most important philosophical problems are affected by that new tendency: «in eis casibus, in quibus Thomistæ, et Scotistæ assignant præcisiones obiectivas, <Nominales> censent tantum dari formales v. g. in distinctione graduum Metaphysicorum, ac divinorum attributorum vel relationum ab essentia».<sup>4</sup>

To bring this challenge and its new terminology closer to the traditional philosopher, Mastri explains that it has vast consequences on the *formalitates*: «pro majori ejus <quæstionis> intelligentia notandum est, duplicem excogitari posse præscindendi modum inter formalitates identificatas, unum *ex parte actus*, alium *ex parte obiecti*».<sup>5</sup> Obviously, *præscindendi modus* and the very nature of the *formalitates* are closely related to each other. For the Nominalists, who reject any objective precision, the “formalities” are completely mind-dependent and not at all in the object. The proponents of an objective precision are divided into two groups, according to their different opinions concerning the mode in which the formalities are in the object: for the Scotists, they are formally, for the Thomists just virtually or *eminenter* in the object.<sup>6</sup>

$$\text{præcisio} \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{ex parte actus (c)} \\ \text{ex parte obiecti} \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{formalitates virtualiter in re (b)} \\ \text{formalitates formaliter in re (a)} \end{array} \right. \end{array} \right.$$

3. «(...) negant præcisiones omnes obiectivas; quibus innixa erat tota metaphysicis doctrina Scoti, et D. Thomæ, et solas admittunt præcisiones formales, quæ se tenent ex parte actus præscindentis» (*Id.*, p. 391a-b).

4. *Id.*, p. 392a.

5. *Id.*, p. 391b.

6. «(...) vel illæ plures formalitates in eadem re *formaliter* continentur, et secundum proprias rationes formales, quomodo animalitas, et rationalitas dicuntur esse formaliter in homine, ac attributa in Deo, vel *virtualiter solum*, et *eminenter*, quo pacto calor, et siccitas dicuntur contineri in luce solari» (*Ib.*). The examples, of course, imply a traditionally scotist view.

The result are three main types of precision and, accordingly, three ways to distinguish between *formalitates*:<sup>7</sup>

- a) *præcisio obiectiva ex natura rei independenter ab intellectus negotiatione – distinctio formalis* (Scotism)
- b) *præcisio obiectiva cum fundamento in re – distinctio rationis cum fundamento in re*, i.e. *distinctio rationis ratiocinatae* (Thomism)
- c) *præcisio formalis – distinctio rationis* (Nominalism)

### 1. Mastri against the Nominalists

This classification, followed by an outline of Mastri’s own opinion, is presented in the first article of *In Met.*, disp. 6, q. 16. The second article is dedicated to the opponents, among them Hurtado, who argues as follows:

- M) Where there is no whiteness, there is no being white, and where there is no distinction, there is no being distinct.
- m) But the *distinctio rationis* is formally not in the object.
- C) Therefore, the being distinct is not formally in the object (and so there is no such distinction or precision *ex parte objecti*).<sup>8</sup>

The *minor* is proven: the *distinctio rationis* is an act of thought and therefore in the intellect.<sup>9</sup>

Oviedo agrees that the distinction is formally in the intellect. But he supports the objection against Hurtado according to which the distinction can very well communicate its formal effect, the being distinct, to the object. Similarly, the act of thought is formally in the intellect, and still the object, in reference to this

7. *Ib.* Cf. W. HÜBENER – S. MEIER-OESER, “Præcisio”, in *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie*, vol. VII, Basel 1989, col. 1212-1215; here: col. 1213.

8. «Primo arguit Hurtado contra præcisiones obiectivas disp. 6. Met. sec. 4. subsec. 4.: ubi non est ratio per quam aliquid constituitur distinctum, non potest esse distinctum, quia distinctum est formaliter a distinctione, sicut album ab albedine, et ubi non est albedo, non potest esse formaliter album, sed distinctio rationis non est formaliter in objecto, ergo illius effectus formalis non potest esse in objecto, ergo esse distinctum non est formaliter in objecto: atque ita non datur distinctio, seu præcisio ex parte objecti» (MASTRI, *In Met.*, disp. 6, q. 16, a. 2 *Argumenta non præscindentium diluuntur*, n. 303, p. 397a-b).

9. «(...) probatur minor, omnis actus intellectus est in intellectu, sed distinctio est consideratio unius sine alio, quæ formaliter in actu intellectus consistit, ergo distinctio rationis est in intellectu» (*Id.*, p. 397b).

act, is called “being thought”.<sup>10</sup> Oviedo goes so far as to say that the object, by the intentional division or plurality, is constituted as *plura formaliter*.<sup>11</sup> But with the distinction being formally in the intellect, this being *plura formaliter* remains an extrinsic denomination to the object.<sup>12</sup>

### 1.1 “*Formalis distinctio*” – “*Effectiva distinctio*”

Mastri rejects both positions, especially for their common assertion that the act of thought is formally the distinction. The act of thought, Mastri explains, is only the *effectiva distinctio* – the effective cause of the distinction. The *formalis distinctio* – in the sense of what the distinction formally is, not to be mistaken for the *distinctio formalis ex natura rei* – is not an act of thought, but a negation. It is only objectively in the intellect and formally in the object *per quasi inhærentiam*, in a way, in which also beings of reason can inhere.<sup>13</sup>

But what exactly is the relation between object and acts of thought? As far as the objective precision is based on the *distinctio formalis*, this is simple: «cum ista distinctio antevertat omnino opus intellectus, nec formaliter, nec effective dependet ab ipsa cognitione, sed cognitio ipsam jam factam reperit»<sup>14</sup> – the

10. The objection is presented by Mastri as follows: «Dices distinctionem, quæ est formaliter in intellectu, communicare etiam objectis suum effectum formalem scilicet esse distinctum, sicut cognitio est formaliter in intellectu, a qua tamen objectum dicitur cognitum, formæ enim extrinsece communicant objectis formales suos effectus». Hurtado has two replies to this objection: «Contra instat Hurtad...»; «Et quod affertur de cognitionis effectum formali...». Oviedo, in support of the objection, again replies to Hurtado: «ad primam Hurtad. instantiam...»; «ad aliam instantiam de esse cognito...» (*Ib.*).

11. *Ib.*

12. «(...) cum talis distinctio sit formaliter actus ipse intellectus, est subjective in intellectu ipso dumtaxat, nec potest objectum ipsum denominare, et afficere, nisi terminative, et per extrinsecam denominationem» (*Ib.*).

13. «(...) formalis distinctio non est ipsa cognitio, sed ipsa negatio, per quam unum non est aliud, vel ipsa relatio media inter extrema, quæ non sunt idem, unde cognitio non est ipsa formalis distinctio, sed effectiva distinctio, et sic quamvis effectiva distinctio sit formaliter in intellectu subjective, distinctio tamen formalis non est in ipso subjective, sed solum objective, et in objecto est formaliter per quasi inhærentiam eo modo, quo inhærentia entibus rationis convenire potest» (*Ib.*).

14. *Id.*, n. 304, p. 397b.

cognition finds it. And for this reason, at least this specific nominalist argument does not prove anything against this type, the scottist type of objective precision.

So the danger is for those objective precisions, «*quas dicimus fieri actualiter in objecto ex vi distinctionis ratiocinatæ*». <sup>15</sup> In Scotism, this type of distinction is not required to explain metaphysical composition, but it is nevertheless of great importance to Mastri: «(...) *gradus transcendentis in creatis, et prædicata Dei quidditativa (...) secernantur sola distinctione ratiocinatæ*». <sup>16</sup> The following table may show how the *distinctio rationis ratiocinatæ* is produced: <sup>17</sup>

	antecedenter..	actus rectus	actus reflexus
	virtualis pluralitas objecti	actualis pluralitas cognitionum – formalitatium	
distinctio:			
- qualis	virtualis, fundamentalis	actualis	
- ubi	subjective in re	subjective in re, objective in intellectu	
formalitates:			
- fiunt		actualiter plures et distinctæ	
- cognoscuntur		virtualiter plures, fundamentaliter distinctæ	actualiter plures et distinctæ

15. *Ib.*

16. *Id.*, q. 15 *De Identitate, et Distinctione rationis ratiocinatæ*, a. 1 *Quid sit ista distinctio, nec ipsam cum formali coincidere*, n. 276, p. 383a.

17. *Id.*, q. 16, a. 2, n. 304, pp. 397b-398a.

1.2 *Virtual distinction; virtual plurality;  
plurality of acts; actual distinction*<sup>18</sup>

My main question now, regarding this table, is: what exactly is the “*quasi inhærentia*” by which the distinction can be subjectively in the object, first as a *virtualis distinctio* and then, after the direct act of thought, as a *distinctio actualis* (*distinctio rationis ratiocinatæ*)?<sup>19</sup> Mastri is working with the distinction between *objectum motivum* (*objectum primario terminativum*) and *objectum terminativum* (*objectum secundario terminativum*). The latter ones are objects for which the ability to terminate a cognition (*posse cognitionem terminare*) is only an extrinsic denomination. The *posse concipi*, as well, is an extrinsic denomination for them. They do not have it before they are actually conceived by an intellect. The most prominent of these objects are beings of reason.<sup>20</sup>

For Mastri, objective precisions are something quite similar. Before any act of thought, there is a virtual distinction in the object and therefore also a virtual plurality. This virtual plurality, however, is not a plurality of objects which could each motivate a different act of thought. Nevertheless, it can become the cause of

18. On virtuality, cf. Sv.K. KNEBEL, “Virtualität I”, in *Historisches...*, vol. XI, Basel 2001, col. 1062-1066.

19. Cf. MASTRI, *In Met.*, disp. 6, q. 15, a. 1, n. 274, p. 382a: «Insuper ostendi potest possibilitas huius distinctionis rationis ratiocinatæ ex possibilitate distinctionis virtualis iam probata supra ex professo q. 12. nam distinctio illa virtualis coincidit prorsus cum distinctio rationis ratiocinatæ, aut certe est fundamentum eius, et dicitur distinctio virtualis, quatenus præcedit huiusmodi fundamentum in re, dicitur vero ratiocinata, quando per actum intellectus inadæquate concipientis, et præscindentis ista virtualitas distinctionis reducitur ad actum formando de eadem re simplici plures conceptus inadæquatos».

20. «At male rursus Amico illam doctrinam de terminatione cognitionis assumit ut universaliter veram, quasi objectum semper de se habeat esse terminativum cognitionis independenter ab ea, quamvis enim id verum sit de objecto motivo, ac primario terminativo, ut dictum est in Lib. de Anim. Non tamen verificatur de objectis secundario tantum terminativis, sicut sunt entia rationis, nam in ente rationis posse concipi, vel posse cognitionem terminare non dicit intrinsecam denominationem, sed extrinsecam tantum, cum non prius habeat esse intelligibile, quam intellectum, et intantum dicatur posse concipi, quatenus potentia intellectiva valet illud effingere» (MASTRI, *In Met.*, disp. 6, q. 16, a. 2, n. 304, p. 398a).

an actual plurality of actually distinct cognitions<sup>21</sup> – it is well possible that an actual effect depends upon a virtual cause, as is the case with the heat which is only virtually in the sunlight but actually in the exposed object.<sup>22</sup> This is where the formalities arise: they are what terminates these cognitions.

So there is a stunning balance: the formalities themselves are fictions of the mind, like beings of reason. But their plurality stems from the object rather than from the intellect.<sup>23</sup>

The virtual distinction, which precedes the act, has another function. Because it is subjectively in the thing, and because it is the foundation of the actual distinction, the actual distinction must also be subjectively in the thing,<sup>24</sup> *per quasi inhærentiam*.

### 1.3 “*Fieri*” – “*Cognosci*”

The production of the distinction as well as of the formalities is not the same as their being known:

verum est tamen per illum actum rectum non attingi formalitates illas, ut actualiter plures, immo potius per ipsum fiunt actualiter plures, sed hoc habetur solum ex vi actus reflexi, quo cognoscuntur illæ formalitates, ut actualiter plures, et distinctæ, ex vi autem actus recti cognoscuntur solum, ut virtualiter plures, et fundamentaliter distinctæ, licet per ipsum fiant actualiter plures, et distinctæ, eo modo quo discurrere solemus de formatione entis rationis, eiusque cognitione.<sup>25</sup>

The distinction between being produced and being known is actually very important for Mastri when he discusses beings of reason, which have an *esse intelligibile* not before having an *esse intellectum*. In a sense, though, the basic epistemological principle of «Quic-

21. «(...) ipsa quoque cognitionum pluralitas actualis pendet a virtuali pluralitate objecti» (*Id.*, p. 398b).

22. «(...) bene enim potest effectus secundum suum esse formale dependere a causa virtuali, ut calor est a calore virtuali lucis, et creaturæ a Deo, ut virtualiter continente perfectiones illarum» (*Ib.*).

23. «(...) duplex illa terminatio potius ex parte objecti se tenebit, quam ex parte intellectus» (*Ib.*). «(...) illa distinctio et pluralitas nedum ex parte intellectus, sed etiam objecti se tenebit» (*Ib.*).

24. «(...) sicut quando erat virtualis dicebatur esse subjective in re, et in objecto, sic etiam ratione talis fundamenti, postquam facta est actualis, dici debet esse subjective in re, et objective solum in intellectu» (*Id.*, pp. 397b-398a).

25. *Id.*, p. 398a.

quid intelligitur prius est intelligibile, quam intelligatur»<sup>26</sup> remains valid, because a being of reason is the effect rather than the object of the act by which it is produced (as a knowable). That is why for it to be known a second, reflex act is required.<sup>27</sup> The same is true for the *distinctio rationis ratiocinatæ* and the formalities it entails.

## 2. Confusion

For the Nominalists, the formalities are not at all in the object – not even virtually, as Mastri is defending here. Therefore, it is always the whole object which is attained by a cognition:

Conveniunt igitur in hoc præcisio formalis, et obiectiva, quod utraque est imperfecta cognitio objecti, at obiectiva differt a formali, quia hæc attingit totum obiectum, illa vero inadæquate solum secundum unam formalitatem, seu secundum unum gradum.<sup>28</sup>

So for the Nominalists, the rational distinction emerges only in the course of the cognition process and lacks any *fundamentum in re*. Consequently, they do not distinguish between *distinctio rationis ratiocinatæ* (sc. *cum fundamento in re*) and *distinctio rationis ratiocinantis*.<sup>29</sup>

According to the first of their strategies, which is derived from sensual cognition, there are two ways of perceiving: *imperfecte* or *confuse* (when we see whiteness from far so that we can only tell that it is a colour); *perfecte* or *præcise* (when we can finally tell that what we see is white). This is the Nominalists' basic example of a *præcisio formalis* in the absence of any *præcisio obiec-*

26. *Id.*, disp. 2 *De natura entis*, q. 9 *An detur ens abstrahens ab ente reali, et rationis, positivo, et negativo*, a. 1 *Nonnulla de ente rationis recoluntur ex Logica*, n. 233, p. 103a.

27. «Deinde quæst. 2 art. 2 ad 1. prin. explico, quo pacto ens rationis etiam quoad suum esse formale, et actuale dici queat habere prius esse intelligibile, quam intellectum, explico autem distinguendo de duplici cognitione entis rationis, una directa, altera quasi reflexa (...) unde in ea <cognitione reflexa> habet ens rationis præcise rationem obiecti, non effectus» (*Ib.*).

28. *Id.*, disp. 6, q. 16, [Prologus], n. 292, p. 392a.

29. Arriaga is an exception. Cf. Rodrigo DE ARRIAGA, *Cursus philosophicus*, In Log., disp. 5 *De distinctione graduum inter se et a singularitatibus*, s. 2 *Deturne a parte rei alia distinctio inter gradus superiores et inferiores, etc.*, subs. 3 *Sententia P. Lyncei*, n. 58, Lugduni<sup>2</sup>1669, p. 101b. See also note 45.



*tiva* – the object, in both cases, is simple whiteness.<sup>30</sup> As there is a kind of intellectual cognition «*quæ immediate excitatur per speciem productam per phantasma materiale*» and which is therefore completely similar to sensual cognition, this “confusion strategy” is well suitable to explain the difference between the concept of colour and the concept of whiteness.<sup>31</sup>

Peter Auriol was probably the first to explain generality with imperfect or confuse conception:<sup>32</sup>

Ex hoc enim quod res facit imperfectam impressionem sui in intellectu, oritur conceptus generis, quæ [quo?] res concipitur imperfecte, et indistincte. Ex hoc vero, quod eadem res facit perfectam impressionem sui in intellectu, oritur conceptus differentię, quo res concipitur in esse specifico, et distincto.<sup>33</sup>

The conceptual difference does play an important role, but the fact that Auriol sees the thing itself at the root of this difference might be surprising. The conceptualist character of Auriol’s theory is further challenged by his ruling out any explanation that does not go directly from the thing to the concepts: «*res est*

30. «Præterea has præcisiones formales sine obiectivis implicare ostenditur ex ipsa earum explicatione ab Adversariis data, ut enim constat ab initio quæstionis præcisionem formalem sine obiectiva explicant exemplo visionis albedinis a longe, quæ sit ita confusa, ut solum discernere possim esse colorem, non vero esse albedinem, aut alterius determinatæ speciei; in hoc enim casu talis visio attingit albedinem nedum secundum rationem genericam coloris, sed etiam secundum specificam, ita ut ex parte objecti nihil attingendum remaneat, alioquin sensus præscindere posset rationem communem a particulari et universale efficere, nihilominus totum illud objectum ita imperfecte cognoscit, ac si solum cognovisset rationem coloris, non vero rationem albedinis; et hanc dicunt esse præcisionem formalem prout distinguitur ab obiectiva, in qua non attingitur totum objectum, et secundum omnem sui formalitatem, sed tantum secundum aliquam, quem quidem præscindendi modum non admittunt» (MASTRI, *In Met.*, disp. 6, q. 16, a. 1 *Præter formales præcisiones, dari quoque obiectivas*, n. 302, p. 397a). «Dices attingi quidem per eam visionem rationem differentialem albedinis, implicite tamen, et confuse, ideoque ab aliis coloribus per eam discerni non posse» (*Ib.*).

31. Pedro HURTADO DE MENDOZA, *Disputationes de universa philosophia*, Disp. met., disp. 6 *De distinctione*, s. 5 *Quæ requirantur ad distinctionem rationis ratiocinatæ. Item et ratiocinantis*, § 78, Lugduni 1617, p. 1144.

32. Cf. Sv.K. KNEBEL, “Verworrenheit”, in *Historisches...*, vol. XI, col. 1014-1017.

33. Petrus AUREOLUS, *Commentaria in secundum librum Sententiarum*, dist. 3, q. 2, a. 4; ed. Romæ 1605, p. 66b Cf.

apta nata immediate immutare visum ad plures apprehensiones distinctas, de eadem tamen re»<sup>34</sup> (the same is true for the intellectual cognition, because «Non minus est virtus distinctiva intellectus, quam sit sensus»<sup>35</sup>). His opponents say that these different *immutationes* cannot take place without the experience of different *operationes*.<sup>36</sup> He replies that anything intermediating between res and impression would be mere *apparentia extrinseca* – irrelevant to the emergence of the distinction between concepts and, ultimately, between essential properties.<sup>37</sup>

In his insistence on the thing being the origin of the difference between generic and specific concept and in his rejection of any reference to “different operations”, Auriol is more of a realist than Thomas Aquinas and his modern followers.<sup>38</sup> What, then, distinguishes the modern nominalist position?

### 3. *Connotation*

Pedro Hurtado, at the end of his presentation of the confusion strategy, cites Auriol as an authority.<sup>39</sup> But he goes on to pre-

34. *Id.*, a. 1, p. 61b Bf.

35. *Id.*, p. 61a F - b A.

36. «Dicetur quod illæ diversæ immutationes non sunt sine experientiae diversarum operationum, quoniam experimur ibi operationes diversas, unde experimur, quod albedo ex remotis non immutat visum, et cum hoc convenit cum nigredine, sed de prope disgregat visum, et nigredo congregat; disgregare autem, et movere sunt operationes diversæ eiusdem rei: ergo ratio non concludit» (*Id.*, a. 4, p. 61b C).

37. «Contra: Bene volo, quod res una faciat diversas impressiones, sed quod oporteat ibi concurrere diversa apparentia extrinseca, hoc falsum puto. Unde immutatio illa, et disgregatio sunt ipsæmet impressiones» (*Id.*, p. 61b Cf).

38. Cf. W. HÜBENER, “Konzeptualismus”, in *Historisches...*, vol. IV, Basel 1976, col. 1089f: «Aureoli ist im übrigen insofern in höherem Grade Realist als Thomas, als für ihn die begriffliche Unterscheidung der allgemeinen Prädikate von den Dingen selbst bewirkt wird (‘diversitas obiectiva, quæ est diversitas conceptuum, est ex diversitate formali impressionum factarum in intellectu’) und die Begriffe so ‚aliquid veræ realitatis‘ enthalten (‘conceptus obiectivi (...) claudunt in se realitates rerum, quæ sunt extra’) [II *Sent.*, dist. 3, q. 2, a. 4 = (1605) 66b C; I *Sent.*, dist. 23, a. 2 = 533a D; dist. 33, a. 3 = 739b C; dist. 36, a. 2 = 836b E]».

39. «Et quidem hoc genus distinctionis sine connotatis expressit Aureolus, in 1. d. 8. p. 3. art. 6. § *Responsio ad obiecta*, 2. ad 5» (HURTADO DE MENDOZA, *Disputationes...*, Disp. met., disp. 6, s. 5, § 78, p. 1144).

sent another strategy which does not rely on a direct link between sensual perception and the formation of the concept, and which is therefore apt to explain metaphysical composition. Auriol in contrast, for whom any difference between generic and specific concept arises from confusion, rejects the idea of metaphysical composition and holds that the intellect, proceeding from generic to specific concept, does not compose but explain. Correspondingly, his theory does not account for a direct cognition of man as a rational being – the only way to conceive a human being imperfectly is to conceive it as an animal.<sup>40</sup>

The second of the Nominalists’ strategies – the one used to explain the formation of universals – works with connotation. Mastri characterizes this strategy as follows:

Respondet Hurtado ex Nominalibus cognitioni de animali ex parte hominis respondere in recto animal rationale, et omnia quæ sunt idem realiter cum illis (...); at vero cognitioni animalis respondent ex parte obliqui connotati sensiones (...); cognitio ergo de animali ex parte objecti habet idem omnino in recto, nempe totum Petrum,

40. «Ex hoc apparet etiam quod, quando res est in illo apparere confuso, dicitur conceptus confusus, sub apparere vero determinato dicitur conceptus determinatus. Ideo intellectus veniens de confuso ad determinatum nec componit, nec aggregat, sed explicat, et hoc est, quod vult dicere Avicenna, ubi supra» (Petrus AUREOLUS, *In II Sent.*, dist. 3, q. 2, a. 4, p. 70a F - b A). «(...) secundum Avicennam 2. Metaph. diversitas generis, et differentiae est diversitas designationis, quia secundum eum, homo non componitur ex animali, et rationale, sed homo est animal, quod est rationale. Unde cum addo ad animal rationale, non est secundum eum compositio, sed est explicatio» (*Id.*, p. 67b Af). As can be seen from the last sentence of this quotation, Auriol, when speaking of rations being added to one another, does not necessarily think of a plurality of *rationes a parte rei*. Cf. R.L. FRIEDMAN, “Peter Auriol on Intentions and Essential Predication”, in *Medieval Analyses in Language and Cognition*, eds. St. Ebbesen and R.L. Friedman, Copenhagen 1999, pp. 415-430; ID., “Conceiving and Modifying Reality: Some Modist Roots of Peter Auriol’s Theory of Concept Formation”, in *Vestigia, Imagines, Verba: Semiotics and Logic in Medieval Theological Texts (XII-XIV Century)*, ed. C. Marmo, Turnhout 1997, pp. 305-321. – In S.F. BROWN, “Petrus Aureoli: De unitate conceptus entis (Reportatio Parisiensis in I Sententiarum, dist. 2, p. 1, qq. 1-3 et p. 2, qq. 1-2)”, in *Traditio*, 50 (1995), pp. 199-248, addition and explication are clearly opposed. I could not convince Russ Friedman of my view that only from the point of view of the logician there is an addition, whereas from a metaphysical point of view, there is just an explanation.

ac cognitio de rationali, sed hæc attingit in obliquo discursum, illa vero sensationem.<sup>41</sup>

*In recto*, both cognitions – the cognition of man as an animal and the cognition of man as a rational being – have the same object. Both cognitions terminate at the same, singular thing. But the cognition of man as an animal connotes man's sensitive operations and attains them *in obliquo*, whereas the cognition of man as a rational being connotes and attains *in obliquo* man's rational operations. Hurtado explains why our cognition of man as an animal connotes the sensations: we get to know that this man is an animal not by directly conceiving some kind of animality but by conceiving the whole man *in ordinem ad sensationem*, and we consequently remain ignorant with regard to his rationality.<sup>42</sup> Our cognition, then, is not wholly adequate; it does not totally or perfectly exhaust its object, «dum vel in ipso non penetrat omnes effectus vel ipsum non cognoscit per omnes effectus».<sup>43</sup>

Francisco de Oviedo, in his treatment of the distinction between *gradus universales*, holds that the *præcisio ex parte actus* is generally based on connotation, and he is therefore even further away from Auriol.<sup>44</sup>

41. MASTRI, *In Met.*, disp. 6, q. 16, a. 1, n. 294, p. 392b.

42. «(...) totus homo cognoscitur clare cum sensatione, et totus dicitur et cognoscitur esse animal: et licet tunc cognoscatur totum rationale in ordinem ad sensationem, tamen totus homo et rationale ignoratur esse rationale: quia non cognoscitur discursus, per quem scimus hominem esse rationale» (HURTADO DE MENDOZA, *Disputationes...*, Disp. met., disp. 6, s. 4 *De distinctione rationis*, subs. 3 *Oppositæ sententiæ fundamento convello*, § 72, p. 1142).

43. *Ib.* Cf. *Id.*, disp. 5 *De unitate universali*, s. 9 *Utrum actus universalis obiectum sit una ratio communis obiectiva abstracta ab inferioribus, an vero plura singularia similia*, subs. 1 *Duæ Realium, Nominaliumque sententiæ*, § 99, p. 1099: «Itaque illa cognitio <hominis ut animal> repræsentat totum obiectum, non tamen eius operationes: et ideo dicitur illud repræsentare inadæquate: id est inadæquate ex parte modi, non tamen ex parte obiecti significati in recto».

44. «Itaque secundum hunc dicendi modum animal præcise cognitum absque rationali, et rationale præcise cognitum absque animali, et homo, in quo est animal per rationale contractum, dicunt ex parte obiecti eandem insectibilem formalitatem, quæ connotatis tantum sensationibus dicitur animal, et connotatis tantum ratiocinationibus dicitur rationale, et connotatis simul sensationibus, et ratiocinationibus dicitur homo» (Francisco DE OVIEDO, *Integer cursus philosophicus*, *Controversiæ metaphysicæ*, contr. 4 *De distinctione entis*, punct. 8 *De distinctione rationis, seu de præcisione inter gradus universales, et quascumque*

Rodrigo de Arriaga distinguishes between two kinds of confusion: one arises from different connotations and is based on the comparison of operations, the other arises from different degrees of “intentional separation” and does not depend on operations.<sup>45</sup> This brings his approach, even if the wording is different, very close to Hurtado’s, especially when considering that Arriaga’s first kind of confusion does allow for man being conceived as a rational being in a direct act.<sup>46</sup>

Mastri argues that the connotative distinction is extrinsic and must therefore be preceded by some intrinsic distinction. This intrinsic distinction is not necessarily the Scotists’ formal distinction, but might also be a *distinctio virtualis*.<sup>47</sup> Also the members of this type of distinction are contained in the object.<sup>48</sup>

*formalitates identificatas*, § 1 *Explicatur difficultas, et variæ proponuntur sententiæ*, n. 1, Lugduni 1640, p. 331a).

45. «Ego enim dixi, posse confusionem actus dupliciter contingere. Primo, ratione diversorum connotatorum. Secundo, ratione maioris separationis intentionalis obiecti ab eo, quod non est ipsum» (ARRIAGA, *Cursus philosophicus*, In Log., disp. 5 *De distinctione graduum inter se et a singularitatibus*, s. 2 *Deturne a parte rei alia distinctio inter gradus superiores et inferiores, etc.*, subs. 3 *Sententia P. Lyncei*, n. 52, p. 100b. Corresponding to these two kinds of confusion, there are two ways to describe the *distinctio rationis ratiocinatæ*, which Arriaga considers the result of confusion: «(...) distinctionem rationis ratiocinatæ (...) esse (...) illam, per quam obiectum comparatur cum diversis operationibus vel cognoscitur differre a pluribus aut paucioribus» (*Id.*, subs. 6 *Respondetur argumentis aliorum Authorum*, n. 90, p. 107b).

46. «(...) vox *animal* et vox *rationale* respectu hominis significant quidem eandem omnino indivisibilem entitatem et formalitatem, cum hac tamen differentia, quod vox *animal* significat hominem, ut confuse cognitum simul cum aliis animantibus, at vero vox *rationale* significat eundem, clare tamen cognitum et ut distinctum ab irrationali, seu a bruto» (*Id.*, nn. 84-85, p. 106b).

47. «Sed facile reiicitur ex nostris principiis hæc Nominalium doctrina, primo quia distinctio per connotata est extrinseca, et regulariter loquendo supponit aliquam priorem intrinsecam in connotante, quotiescumque enim aliquid distinguitur per ordinem ad diversa connotata, ex intrinseco suo habet quod respiciat illa connotata, ergo ex intrinseca sua natura habet, quod sit distinguibile in ordine ad diversa connotata, et consequenter secundum suum esse intrinsecum fundat aliquam distinctionem saltem rationis, ut constat ex dictis supra nu. 248» (MASTRI, *In Met.*, disp. 6, q. 16, a. 1, n. 294, p. 392b) – “nu. 248” refers us to the treatment of the virtual distinction (cf. note 48).

48. «(...) sic patet, quomodo duplex modus assignari potest distinctionis virtualis, unus est, quo sola distinctio est virtualis, non autem continentia distinctorum; alter est, in quo tam distinctio, quam continentia distinctorum est virtualis, ut patet in allatis exemplis de gradibus transcendentibus pro primo, et

### Conclusion

Wolfgang Hübener recommended Mastri's metaphysical disputations as a preparation especially for research on the 14th-century debate on universals.<sup>49</sup> Having followed this advice, I'm led to two conclusions which are not in accord with the results of recent Auriol research as presented by Russ Friedman in his article for the *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.<sup>50</sup>

a) The difference between conceiving confusedly and conceiving precisely is not «a purely psychological difference with no immediate grounds in extra-mental reality». Contrarily, it has its very origin in the thing itself, «quæ virtualiter continet duas impressiones». <sup>51</sup> «(...) how closely our will makes the intellect focus on the information we receive from the object of cognition» determines which concept we actually form, but the choice we have is something presented to us by the thing. We can't receive an impression which the thing is not apt to make or which is not virtually contained in it.

de calore, et siccitate Solis pro secundo» (*Id.*, q. 12 *De natura Identitatis, et Distinctionis virtualis, eiusque utilitate*, n. 248, p. 370a).

49. Cf. W. HÜBENER, "Die Nominalismus-Legende. Über das Mißverhältnis zwischen Dichtung und Wahrheit in der Deutung der Wirkungsgeschichte des Ockhamismus", in *Spiegel und Gleichnis. Festschrift für Jacob Taubes*, eds. N.W. Bolz and W. Hübener, Würzburg 1983, p. 94.

50. R.L. FRIEDMAN, "Peter Auriol", in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* [<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2002/entries/auriol/>], ed. E.N. Zalta, Winter 2002 Edition.

51. «Secundo noto hic, quod cum quæritur, unde oritur diversitas rationum generis et differentiae, aut intelligis a quo habet ortum non diversificato nec variato; aut a quo habet ortum variato, et diversificato; si primo modo, dico, quod habet ortum a re eadem simplicissima, quæ virtualiter continet duas impressiones, non quod hoc, quod dico virtualiter (duæ impressiones) ponant in re aliquam diversitatem, sed idem est, ac si dicerem, eandem rem continentem duos effectus. ¶ Si vero quæris, a qua diversitate primo oritur hæc diversitas, dico quod a formali similitudine alia, et alia, quam intellectus potest concipere de eadem re, quanto res apta nata est assimilare sibi pluribus modis ipsum intellectum. ¶ Si vero loqueris formaliter, et complete, a quo est diversitas generis, et differentiae, dico quod ab alio, et alio esse cognito, quæ habet res per alium, et alium actum intellectus» (PETRUS AUREOLUS, *In II Sent.*, dist. 3, q. 2, a. 4, p. 68b Ef). «(...) fantasma, et intellectus agens, et intellectus possibilis sunt in potestate voluntatis; (...) ideo voluntarie possum, et volo me convertere ad maiorem, vel minorem impressionem» (*Id.*, p. 68b B).

This psychological aspect of the problem of universals does not remain without consequences for its ontological aspect, a fact which is pointed out by Auriol himself when he discusses the unity of the species:

illa unitas est in re extra *in potentia, et inchoative*, in quantum nata est causare in intellectu impressionem perfectam consimilem alterius rei, ex qua sequitur unitas actus, et ex consequenti unitas unius conceptus obiectivi.<sup>52</sup>

So for Auriol, universality is potentially and incipiently in the thing. This is something he has in common with moderate realists, Scotists and Thomists, whose position is characterized by Mastri as follows:

Tertia demum sententia concedit a parte rei universale in essendo, scilicet naturas communes in singularibus existentes, non quidem quasi sit completum, et in actu, sed *inchoate solum, et remote*, quatenus fundare potest secundam intentionem universalis Logici, quod solum fatetur esse universale completum, et in actu, at non habere esse, nisi per intellectus operationem, quæ est vera sententia in omnibus scholis recepta.<sup>53</sup>

b) Mastri's characterization also shows that, according to moderate realism, it is only in the intellect and only by intellectual operation that the *universale in essendo* has actual existence. When Auriol says that «omnis res, eo quod est, singulariter est»,<sup>54</sup> this does not set him apart from moderate realism.<sup>55</sup>

Mastri calls Auriol the *Promptuarium Neotericorum*.<sup>56</sup> But the modern Nominalists – and this shows how adequate Mastri's ex-

52. *Id.*, dist. 9, q. 2, a. 4, p. 109b B.

53. MASTRI – BELLUTO, *In Org.*, disp. 8 *De universalibus in communi*, q. 1 *An detur Universale a parte rei*, n. 2; in IDEM, *Philosophiæ...*, vol. I (archetypal edition Venetiis<sup>2</sup>1646), p. 168a.

54. Petrus AUREOLUS, *In II Sent.*, dist. 9, q. 3, a. 3, p. 114a F.

55. Cf. FRIEDMAN, "Peter...". ID., "Peter Auriol on Intellectual Cognition of Singulars", in *Vivarium*, 38 (2000), pp. 177-193.

56. «Cuius [sc. Auriol's] vestigiis inhærere non erubescit tota fere famosa schola Jesuitarum, qui suas præcipuas sententias modumque illas defendendi ab acutissimo Aureolo desumpserunt, unde non abs re tantum Doctorem in Logica frequenter 'Promptuarium Neotericorum' appellavimus» (MASTRI, *In Met.*, disp. 6, q. 1 *De potentia activa, et passiva, ut spectant ad Metaphysicam*, a. 4 *De actione, et passione*, n. 33, p. 279b).

pression is – take only some things out of this “storeroom” or “repository”, and leave others behind. They do not use his confusion strategy to explain the formation of universals – but they do work with different modes of conceiving. And there again, the modern “conceiving imperfectly” may result not only in the generic concept but also in the concept of the specific difference – depending not immediately on the thing, but on the operations by which the thing makes itself known.